

Російської Федерації, спрямовані на розрив економічних зв'язків із Росією. Після двох світових воєн для запобігання таким масштабним військовим конфліктам засоби економічних обмежень стали важливим інструментом реагування на будь-які зловживання з боку держави-агресора. Економічна війна розглядається як альтернатива традиційній війні. З цієї причини питання санкційної політики стало об'єктом міжнародних відносин, політології, а також досліджень безпеки та миру. Після анексії Криму та війни, розв'язаної Росією на сході України, питання запровадження санкцій проти Росії, їх режим та ефективність стало об'єктом для вищезгаданих досліджень. Після повномасштабного вторгнення в Україну в лютому 2022 року проблемі запровадження санкцій проти Російської Федерації приділяється більше уваги як науковцями, так і політиками. У статті розглянуто особливості санкцій, які застосовуються до країни-агресора. Метою статті є дослідження санкційної політики союзників і партнерів України щодо Росії. В основу статті покладено метод контент-аналізу заяв, офіційних анонсів як урядових, так і надурядових організацій таких як ЄС, ООН, а також статті в періодичних виданнях і наукові роботи, присвячені санкціям. Цей аналіз є проміжним дослідженням санкційної політики проти Росії, який буде потрібний для виявлення неефективності/ефективності економічних санкцій як реакції на російську агресію. Аналіз санкцій як інструменту міжнародної політики може бути використаний для переосмислення важливості економічних санкцій як частини стратегії розбудови миру.

Ключові слова: економічні санкції, Україна, санкційна політика, Росія.

<https://doi.org/10.31392/NPU-nc.series22.2022.32.08>

UDC 327.7 + 341.215.2

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DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY FOR RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR ANALYSIS

The question remains pertinent if the concept of democratic peace is viable for political agenda and international relations system of the 21st c. One can witness both successful and questionable examples of democratic peace theory implementation, yet it is apparent that transition to democracy is not always an unproblematic and consistent process. The goal of the article is to analyze the viability of the democratic peace theory for Russia-Ukraine war analysis. The selected method is historical analysis of the democratic peace theory advancement, Ukraine's and Russia's political development, economic cooperation and participation in international organizations. Besides, secondary data analysis was employed for the research purposes. It can be concluded that democratic peace theory hardly appears to be a viable framework for Russia-Ukraine war analysis.

As to the first tenet of the democratic peace theory – republican institutions – both Ukraine and Russia are republics, and strictly formally fulfill this criterion, yet Russia's being a democracy de facto has proven to be erroneous. Regarding the second tenet of the democratic peace theory – economic interdependence (universal community) – prior to the start of the war in 2014 one could witness a considerable, yet declining level of economic cooperation between Ukraine and Russia, complicated by asymmetrical relationship between the two states. Even though, in accordance with the theory tenet, considerable economic cooperation should have prevented Russian aggression against Ukraine as a trading partner, the initiated war can, apparently, be explained by political and security perceptions which outweighed purely economic factors. Regarding the third tenet of the democratic peace theory, one can witness a certain level of cooperation between Ukraine and Russia within international organizations, yet fundamental ideological differences between the two countries are vividly reflected in this sector. It can be concluded that the democratic peace theory is hardly applicable for Russia-Ukraine war analysis, and the reasons of the ongoing war can be

explained by current Ukraine's standing as democracy in transit and Russia's becoming a consolidated authoritarian regime. Thereby Ukraine is now spearheading a fight for democracy worldwide, while democracy development in Russia is further deteriorating.

Key words: *democracy, peace, theory, Ukraine, civil society, nations in transit, international organizations.*

Introduction. There are numerous versions of democracy as a type of ideology and system of values. Various researchers of different epochs interpreted the notion of democracy in peculiar ways creating particular types of this political regime, e.g. Athenian democracy, Western democracy, social democracy, ethno-democracy, totalitarian democracy, e-democracy, to name a few. Multiple interpretations of democracy sometimes lead to situations when the term is used to denote a type of regime quite remote from «people's rule» in its classical terms, yet it demonstrates the variety and evolution of the said political concept.

Democratic peace is a type of international relations theory aimed at providing a framework for policy analysis and development of specific political agendas. In particular, democratic peace is characterized by such features as rule of law, respect for human rights, non-violence, existence of a constitution as the main law of a country, trust in inherent goodness of human nature, political optimism, belief in ability of nation states to reach agreements and abide by them. Kant (as cited in Simpson 109) discusses three notions for ensuring peace between democracies: republican institutions, a pacific union between states, and an ethos of universal hospitality. Thomas Paine also dwelled on the idea that a world of democratic states will be peaceful (Gat, 73).

Yet, reality appears to be much more complex and multifaceted. Welzel and Kirsch (as cited in Mihr, 2020) analyze the discourse on the variety of notions of democracy. Haerpfer and Kizilova conclude that authoritarian societies are characterized by a widespread «authoritarian notion of democracy», e.g. when political leaders in China claim their political regime to be so-called managed or sovereign democracy (as cited in Mihr, 2020). Such countries as the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Democratic Republic of North Korea have the term «democracy» included in their official name. Yet these states have the last and penultimate ranks respectively in Democracy Index 2021 (№ 164 and № 165), thus appearing among the bottom five countries in the list (Democracy Index 2021). In accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, Russia is a democratic federative law-governed state. Yet, according to Democracy Index 2021, Russia is on the 124th place out of 167 countries and its regime is characterized as «authoritarian».

One of the core values of a democratic society is freedom of speech and self-expression. Findings from the World Values Survey 2020 show that mass self-expression values are highly important for flourishing of democratic institutions in a society. With the rise of post-industrial society countries with authoritarian regimes come under growing mass pressure for political liberalization (World Values Survey 2020). This process contributed to democratization waves in the 1980s and 1990s and is one of the factors contributing to more recent processes of democracy advancement (World Values Survey 2020). Yet, 2020 and 2021 were characterized by weakening of democracies worldwide and rise of authoritarianism trends, partly due to challenges of fighting COVID-19 pandemic. According to World Ahead 2022 forecast, democracy vs. autocracy is №1 trend to watch in 2022. Strengthening democracy and withstanding authoritarian regimes was mentioned among top three foreign policy priorities of the U.S. in 2021 (Remarks by President Biden on America's Place in the World).

In order to function efficiently democracy needs to be widely accepted by a certain society or community. Diamond (as cited in Mihr, 2020) notes that democracy is more deeply rooted when the citizenry embraces it as «the only game in town». Matter-of-course, such evolution of ideas and perceptions requires time and effort of civil society members.

Respect for human rights is considered to be at the very core of democratic principles. The rights enshrined in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights signed by the majority of the UN member states and subsequent human rights instruments are equally important for democracy as they ensure inclusivity for all groups, including equality in respect of

access to civil and political rights (Lally, 2017). And according to Balibar (2003), egalitarianism (democratic or not) of modern politics is a good illustration of the process of the need to build an «ideological world» common to the exploiters and the exploited, despite their antagonism. Liashchenko (2019) holds that for democracy to function properly, it needs constant protection from its own shortcomings, in particular: excessive will, which can turn into excessive slavery, rejection of virtuous people; and the most destructive one – nurturing a future tyrant who grows from the democratic root of the people's choice. Thus, one can witness a range of perspectives pertinent to interpretation of the term of democracy and implementation of this ideology in the current system of international relations.

The notion of democracy in its application to international relations theory and conflict resolution stipulated the so-called democratic peace theory. One of the arguments in favour of the promotion of liberal democracy all over the world is the belief in the so-called «democratic peace theories», which have their philosophical groundings in Kant's 1795 essay *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Study* (Müllerson, 2013). As Wiśniewski (as cited in Opoka, 2016) notes, according to the theory, the probability of the war between two democratic states is very low.

The **problem** remains **pertinent** if the concept of democratic peace is viable for political agenda and international relations system of the 21st century. Dülffer (2020) makes a conclusion that the answer which has received the most widespread acceptance is that there is a causal link between democracy and peace. Developed democracies, per Levy (as cited in Dülffer, 2020), do not wage war against each other - this would be «the closest thing we have to a law in international politics». More specifically, in an ideal final stage of humankind, democracy and peace would prevail worldwide (Dülffer, 2020).

Further spreading of democracy in the 20th century inspired optimism among proponents of Western values and testified to viability of democratic peace theory. In the 1980s, several authors went as far as to claim that the absence of wars between democracies or liberal states is both a fact in international relations and empirical law of International Relations theory (Müllerson, 2013). Wright (as cited in Müllerson, 2013) had analysed major wars since 1480 to 1941 and concluded that the existence of independent states with elective governments, i.e. democracies, greatly enhances the chances of maintaining peace. An important case in this regard is the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which consists of democratic countries. During the history of this organization its member states have never fought each other (Il'ko Kucheriv «Democratic Initiatives» Foundation), with the exception of the Cyprus tension between Greece and Turkey.

Currently Western states can be characterized by strong and deep-rooted democratic traditions. Western states have become consolidated democracies, in other words they are no longer in danger of reverting to authoritarian rule (Sroka et al., 2017). Even though the events surrounding the U.S. presidential elections 2020, to a certain degree, challenged the strength of democratic institutions in the country, the state leadership managed to rectify political instability. European countries are also making efforts to preserve robustness of democratic institutions. Systemic stability and the prospect for a peaceful and cooperative pan-European security order are largely contingent upon the successful transition to the market and multiparty democracy in Europe and along its periphery (Sperling et al., 2003).

Yet, there is a number of exceptions which appear to somewhat thwart postulates of the aforementioned theory. One should note that democracies have been involved in a number of armed conflicts among each other in the 20th century, which, to a certain extent, undermines the above statements about viability of democratic peace theory principles. Among cases of wars between democracies one can note the Yugoslav wars among Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia, Paquisha and Cenepa wars between Ecuador and Peru, Turkish invasion of Cyprus, to name a few. At the same time, one can note that even though the above-mentioned countries have a republican form of government and elective political authorities, they have had a long history of authoritarian regimes. For instance, as to Bosnia and Herzegovina, per Stanovčić (as cited in Palmberger, 2016), «the people», in the sense of *demos* or *plebs* and as political subjects, have lost political influence and meaning in the Yugoslav constitutional system, while the nations and nationalities have become

the main political subjects. As Tepavac (as cited in Palmberger, 2016) holds, its nations enjoyed more equality of rights in Yugoslavia than in any other socialist country, but there was a tremendous lack of universal democratic rights of individuals, uncoupled from the nation.

Advocates of democratic peace theory admit that it is not universally acceptable, however still claim that democracies generally are less belligerent toward one another. The usual response by proponents of democratic peace theory has been to deny the applicability of democratic peace theory to the specific case and to modify their central hypothesis to «democratic states almost never wage war against each other» (Rauch, 2016). Speaking of further applicability of democratic peace theory to conflict resolution and mitigating consequences of crises one can look at how political offenders were viewed in European countries while those transitioned from autocracy towards democracy. Per Van den Wijngaert (as cited in Jansson, 2019), acceptance of political offences in certain contexts made it possible to support those who were in the process of trying to overturn despotic regimes and spread the ideal of the democratic state. Thus, it established the idea that the law limits the state (Jansson, 2019).

Application of democratic peace theory to other cases of Asian, African and European countries leads to ambiguous results. Müllerson (2013) mentions that regime changes (the so-called Arab Spring and Colour Revolutions in some of the former Soviet republics) raise the issue of democratic peace theory usage. In particular, one is suggested to analyze such aspects as external assistance or encouragement of regime change, the use of force for humanitarian purposes and interference in internal conflicts on behalf of either governments or opposition (Müllerson, 2013). For instance, soon after Tunisia President Ben Ali's ouster, Hosni Mubarak's 30-year reign in Egypt would come to an end, and people around the world discussed the prospects of democracy in a region that months prior appeared to be content with authoritarian rule, yet the move to democracy is not that smooth and rapid (Shamaileh, 2017).

Thus, one can witness both successful and questionable examples of democratic peace theory implementation. In any case, it is apparent that the transition to democracy is not always an unproblematic and consistent process. The **goal** of the article is to analyze the viability of the democratic peace theory for Russia-Ukraine war analysis. The **objectives** are to analyze tenets of the democratic peace theory, trace its viability for previous conflict resolution cases and define if it is a relevant framework for Russia-Ukraine war analysis.

The author has utilized the theory of democratic peace grounded in Immanuel Kant's work. Democratic peace theory is one of the most influential paradigms in the study of international relations and international security. The Democratic Peace has emerged as the major 'Kantian' research agenda in the contemporary study of International Relations (McMillan, 2006). According to Kant, first definitive article for perpetual peace is «the civil constitution of every state should be republican», the second article is «the law of nations shall be founded on a federation of free states», the third article is «the law of world citizenship shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality» (Kant, 1795). Reason, in Kant's view, absolutely condemns war as a legal recourse and makes a state of peace a direct duty, even though peace cannot be established except by a compact among nations (Kant, 1795). In this regard, Meierhenrich (as cited in Manan, 2015) notes that Kant distinguished three «definitive articles» of peace, which together constituted a tripod of peace. In the contemporary international system, Kant's definitive articles of peace correspond to the interlocking institutions of democracy («republican constitution»), economic interdependence («cosmopolitan right» and «universal community»), and international organization («pacific federation») (as cited in Manan, 2015). As to the **problem dimensions that have not been studied previously**, it is worthwhile further analyzing the democratic peace theory usage in the particular case of the Russia-Ukraine war. This theoretical framework being one of the leading paradigms in the research of international relations, it is worthwhile intending to apply it in order to analyze the underlying reasons and triggers of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war.

The selected **method** is historical analysis of the democratic peace theory advancement, Ukraine's and Russia's political development, economic cooperation and participation in international organizations. Historical research offers perspectives on phenomena that are

unavailable by any other methodological means (Mason et al., 1997). These perspectives reflect the cultural circumstances and ideological assumptions that underlie phenomena and the role played by key decision makers together with long-term economic, social, and political forces in creating them (Mason et al., 1997).

Besides, secondary data analysis was employed for the research purposes. Hakim defines secondary analysis as «any further analysis of an existing dataset which presents interpretations, conclusions or knowledge additional to, or different from, those presented in the first report on the inquiry as a whole and its main results» (as cited in Johnston, 2014). Secondary data analysis was utilized in order to make comparisons of the two countries' in question political and economic development, democracy ratings and transparency indices.

Results and Discussion. Regarding the first tenet of the democratic peace theory – republican institutions – both Ukraine and Russia strictly formally have a republican form of governance, thereby Russia can be considered a republic *de jure*. According to the Constitution of Ukraine, Article 5, Ukraine is a republic. The people are the bearers of sovereignty and the only source of power in Ukraine, thereby the people exercise power directly and through bodies of state power and bodies of local self-government (Constitution of Ukraine). In accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, Russia is a democratic federal law-bound State with a republican form of government.

Moreover, most states in the region of Europe are now republics. Presence of certain regime in a country largely depends on the will and state of mind of its people. The World Values Survey 2020 has over the years shown that people's beliefs play a key role in economic growth, development of democratic institutions and the extent to which societies have well-functioning government. Actualization of the values of freedom and self-expression would prompt citizens to improve the ways in which society and political system are set up by rejecting authoritarian systems which restrict liberties (Mihir, 2020). In the 1990s Western societies assumed that spreading of democracy would be a source of peace in the region, however by 2013, the Russian Federation saw democratization as a threat worth fighting over (D'Anieri, «Democratic Peace – or War», 2017). Thus, even though, formally, both states in question are republics, and, in theory, should not have engaged in an armed conflict, *de facto*, Russia committed an act of aggression against Ukraine.

Regarding the second tenet of the democratic peace theory – economic interdependence (universal community) – the level of economic cooperation between Ukraine and Russia was traditionally considerable in the 20th and 21st c. Ukraine has a long history of economic cooperation with Russia, with the industrial capacities of the two countries being heavily interdependent, especially the energy sector. The level of economic cooperation was also significant prior to 2014 and is still considerable, yet declining. In September 2022 Ukraine completely banned export of goods to Russia.

The decline in trade began approximately a decade ago. During the decade of 2010-2020, the value of Ukraine-Russia foreign trade in goods dropped sharply from 48.63 billion US dollars in 2011 to 10.23 billion US dollars in 2019 (Veremii et al., 2021). Aside from purely economic and trade reasons, there has been a considerable ideological and political component affecting economic cooperation. Russia's economic pressure, which was an important instrument of its policy towards Ukraine until 2014, has reached a qualitatively new level since the beginning of the aggression (Veremii et al., 2021). Thereby it should be noted that military aggression is just one element of the Russian hybrid warfare against Ukraine, other elements include, *inter alia*, trade and economic pressure, energy blockade and cyber-attacks (Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations). In 2020, Ukraine's trade balance with Russia remained negative and it has decreased significantly compared to 2010-2013 (Veremii et al., 2021).

Russia-Ukraine economic cooperation can be characterized by notable asymmetry. According to some trade positions, Ukraine is still significantly dependent on Russian imports, including energy carriers, mineral products and nuclear fuel, moreover, most of Russia's imported products are goods of strategic importance to Ukraine (Veremii et al., 2021). Identifying alternative markets

for these products' supply is complicated by the factors of transportation and much lower prices, which Russians offer in comparison with other international providers (Veremii et al., 2021).

Thus, one can witness a significant, yet declining level of economic cooperation between Ukraine and Russia. In accordance with the second tenet of the democratic peace theory, close economic cooperation should prevent countries from engaging in an armed conflict. Yet, presence of an asymmetric economic relationship between Russia and Ukraine, divergent views of further political development, coupled by aggressive Russian foreign policy means increased the likelihood of an armed conflict. Even though, according to the democratic peace theory tenet, considerable economic cooperation should have prevented Russian aggression against Ukraine as a trading partner, the initiated war can, apparently, be explained by political motives and security perceptions, which outweighed economic factors.

Concerning the third tenet of the democratic peace theory – international organizations (peace federation) – there are a few stumbling blocks between Ukraine and Russia in this regard. Ever since gaining independence in 1991, Ukraine has been gravitating toward integration into Western institutions and away from Eurasian vector. In particular, Ukraine has always been very cautious about engagement in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) activities. The CIS was founded in December 1991 with the aim of maintaining ties among the USSR republics, which were in the process of gaining independence. Ukraine is one of the founding states of the CIS, at the same time Ukraine is not the organization member, because it did not sign the CIS Statute (Ministry of Justice of Ukraine). In February 2021, Ukraine withdrew from the CIS Agreement on Coordination of Interstate Relations (Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine). Ukrainian government supported the initiative of the Ministry of Digital Transformation and the State Service of Special Communication and Information Protection to withdraw from the Agreement on Coordination of Postal and Electric Communications (Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine). Thus, Ukraine has been consistently distancing itself from this organization aimed at reviving the Soviet legacy.

Ukraine also refused to join Eurasian Customs Union spearheaded by the Russian Federation, Belarus and Kazakhstan. The goal of this organization further joined by Armenia and Kyrgyzstan was to set up a single market of goods and services (World History Institute). Ukraine has traditionally been reluctant toward enhancing Eurasian integration, even though it has been participating in respective negotiations for a while (World History Institute).

During the first decade of the 21st c., Ukraine has been making efforts to balance both Western and Eurasian vectors of economic and political development. Yet, Russia has been voicing strong concerns against Ukraine's potential participation in both the EU and Eurasian Customs Union. In view of aggression against Ukraine, since January 1 2016 Russia suspended free trade agreement between Russia and Ukraine and announced transition to trade rules applicable to the EU members (World History Institute). Since the start of the war, Ukraine and Russia introduced respective economic sanctions against each other. Ukraine, for its part, keeps adjusting its standards and legislation to the standards of the EU, following the selected European integration vector (World History Institute).

Still, one of the most serious impediments in Ukraine-Russia bilateral relations is Ukraine's aspirations to join Euro-Atlantic structures – the EU and NATO. In accordance with the 2018 amendments to the Constitution, Ukraine reaffirms the irreversibility of the country's European and Euro-Atlantic course (Constitution of Ukraine, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine). Ukraine and Russia have completely divergent opinions in this regard. Thus, the Revolution of Dignity started after Ukrainian political leadership's refusal to progress with further EU integration in 2013. In particular, protests began after the Ukrainian government decided not to sign the Association Agreement with the EU.

Ukraine's potential membership in NATO is a source of one of the deepest Russian insecurities. Despite militarization of the occupied Crimea and parts of Donbas, the Russian Federation fears further NATO extension eastwards and attempts to avoid it at all costs, including political manipulation, intimidation of the Ukrainian population, hybrid warfare tactics, disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks and, eventually, direct military aggression. Russia even

tried to obtain guarantees of Ukraine's non-accession from the NATO leadership, completely ignoring national sovereignty of Ukraine and basics of international order established by the UN Charter. Thus, Ukraine and Russia lack mutual vision on participation in a number of influential international organizations.

The two countries keep cooperating on the global and regional level within such international organizations as the United Nations (UN), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and until 2022 – in the Council of Europe (COE). Ukraine is one of the founding members of the UN, along with Russia. Both countries have played an important role in the UN institutions' development during past decades. Yet, presently there are serious tensions related to Russia's status in the UN Security Council (UNSC) as a permanent member with the "veto" right, infamous for blocking decisions on Ukraine after the start of the Russia-Ukraine war. For instance, in 2014, owing to the negative vote of one of its permanent members, the UNSC failed to adopt a draft resolution, which urged countries not to recognize the results of the March 2014 referendum in Crimea (UN Security Council Action on Crimea Referendum Blocked, United Nations). The resolution would have reaffirmed Ukraine's «sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity» and stated that the referendum «can have no validity» (UN Security Council Action on Crimea Referendum Blocked, United Nations).

The UN community keeps supporting Ukraine's case. A strong voice of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) is an important element of international pressure to make Russia begin de-occupation of Ukrainian territory (Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations). Russia's breaches of international law are now being regarded by the International Criminal Court, the International Court of Justice, Arbitration proceedings under UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and European Court for Human Rights (Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations). UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission (HRMMU) was deployed on 14 March 2014 to monitor and report on the human rights situation throughout Ukraine, with particular attention to the Crimea, eastern and southern regions of Ukraine (Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations). Since 2014, the GA has already adopted nine resolutions reaffirming its commitment to Ukraine's territorial integrity and condemning the temporary occupation of Ukraine's territories by Russia (Statement by the Delegation of Ukraine at the UN General Assembly Debate).

Thus, even though both Ukraine and Russia have a long history of cooperation with the UN, the war triggered by Russia seriously hindered this bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Russia's aggression was condemned by the majority of the UN members. Currently, the UN keeps helping Ukraine to restore its rights and territorial integrity, while the Russian Federation attempts to block respective decisions via the United Nations Security Council.

Ukraine and Russia to a certain extent keep cooperating within the OSCE framework. On 21 March 2014, the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) was deployed, following a request to the OSCE by Ukraine's government and a consensus decision by all 57 OSCE participating States (Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations). The SMM was an unarmed, civilian mission, with a mandate covering the entire territory of Ukraine, and its main tasks were to observe and report on the situation in Ukraine; as well as facilitate dialogue among all parties to the conflict (Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations). OSCE responses to the crisis in and around Ukraine included high-level diplomacy and multilateral dialogue; monitoring the security situation on the ground; promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; and strengthening democratic institutions and practices (Permanent Mission of Ukraine to International Organizations in Vienna. OSCE). Per the US Mission to the OSCE, Russia's ongoing aggression against Ukraine, with its military build-up on Ukraine's border at the beginning of 2022, was the greatest security threat facing Europe today: by violating its neighbor's sovereignty and undermining its territorial integrity, Russia aimed to prevent Ukraine from its freely chosen path of full Euro-Atlantic integration. The Russian-Ukrainian confrontation and devastating impact of the ongoing Russian aggression against Ukraine on the European security architecture is a priority of the OSCE agenda since early 2014 (Permanent Mission of Ukraine to International Organizations in Vienna. OSCE). Overwhelming majority of the OSCE members recognize that

restoration of constructive cooperation in the OSCE area is impossible without correcting commitments of the OSCE, violated by Russia (Permanent Mission of Ukraine to International Organizations in Vienna. OSCE). In spring 2022 after intensification of the Russian aggression the SMM was closed.

The OSCE was a part of the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) for negotiations concerning war in Donbas. Trilateral Contact Group, established in June 2014, became a key mediation tool of the OSCE in this war (Permanent Mission of Ukraine to International Organizations in Vienna. OSCE). The TCG included four Working Groups on political, security, economic and humanitarian issues (position of the Ukrainian side on the necessity to establish an additional Working Group on border was not supported by the Russian side) (Permanent Mission of Ukraine to International Organizations in Vienna. OSCE). Thus, OSCE served as the chief mediator in the Donbas confrontation, while Russia's and Ukraine's cooperation within this organization was once again characterized by tensions related to the ongoing war. In September 2022 President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky cancelled the decrees on Ukrainian delegation's participation in the TCG, thus the group was dissolved.

Ukraine and Russia used to have a certain level of cooperation within the framework of the Council of Europe (COE), one of the oldest regional organizations in Europe. One should note uneasiness related to Russia's return to the organization in 2019 after five year of suspension despite ongoing occupation of the Crimea (Warsaw Institute). Since Ukraine's accession to the Council of Europe in 1995, one of the main objectives of co-operation has been to support the country in fulfilling its statutory obligations (Ukraine, Council of Europe). Yet, Ukraine willingly took a number of commitments beyond these obligations in order to enhance democracy and the rule of law in the country (Ukraine, Council of Europe). The COE Action Plan for Ukraine 2018-2022 priorities include relevant judgements of the European Court of Human Rights, resolutions, recommendations and opinions of the COE institutions and expert advisory bodies (Ukraine, Council of Europe). Besides, current Action Plan takes into account the achievements of the Action Plan 2015-2017 and covers the following areas of co-operation: human rights, rule of law and democracy (strengthening democratic governance, promoting participation and diversity) (Ukraine, Council of Europe). Thus, democracy development in Ukraine is regarded as a priority of Ukraine-COE cooperation.

Russia used to be an active member of the COE. The Russian Federation became the 39th Member State of the Council of Europe in February 1996 (Russian Federation, Council of Europe). Actions of the Council of Europe in the Russian Federation include prevention of torture, fight against racism, protection of social rights, protection of minorities, fight against corruption, fight against trafficking in human beings, fight against money laundering, justice system and democracy through law (Russian Federation, Council of Europe). In 2014, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) suspended the voting rights of the Russian delegation due to the annexation of the Crimea and the Kremlin's support for pro-Russians separatists in the Ukrainian Donbas (Warsaw Institute). At first, Moscow responded by boycotting the Assembly, then it stopped paying annual membership contributions to the Council of Europe (one of the largest amounts) (Warsaw Institute). Yet, in 2019 Russia's rights in PACE were restored.

COE kept its diplomatic pressure on Russia. Decision of the Committee of Ministers of the COE «Human Rights Situation in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol (Ukraine)» of May 11, 2021 urged Russia to uphold its obligations under international law and restore territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders, release and allow the return of all Ukrainian citizens and revoke the decision declaring the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People an extremist organisation (Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the Council of Europe). In March 2022 after full-scale invasion into Ukraine Russia ceased to be a member of the Council of Europe.

As a summation, regarding the third tenet of the democratic peace theory, one can witness a certain level of cooperation between Ukraine and Russia within international organizations, yet fundamental ideological differences between the two countries are vividly reflected in this sector.

Ukraine's and Russia's views are divergent regarding their values and further political development and, respectively, the countries have different stances towards participation in international organizations. Ukraine's aspirations to continue integration with the EU triggered political confrontation and resulted in the ongoing war with the Russian Federation. Moreover, Ukraine's aspirations to join the NATO are perceived as a source of deep insecurity by Russia, which contributed to a considerable tension and uncertainty on the international arena at the end of 2021 – start of 2022. Therefore, lack of active stable cooperation between Ukraine and Russia in the sphere of international organizations aligns with the countries' mutual animosity and can, respectively, explain the war between the states, in accordance with the third tenet of the democratic peace theory.

Based on the analysis of the three tenets of democratic peace theory, it can be concluded that, overall, Ukraine-Russia relations prior to 2014 only partly corresponded to the formal criteria of the theory postulates: presence of republican governments, economic cooperation and participation in common international organizations. The war, which, nevertheless, started, can, apparently, be explained by the actual level of democratic development in Ukraine and Russia, the former being a transitional democracy aspiring for further strengthening of democratic values, while the latter becoming a consolidated authoritarian regime. The main argument of democratic peace theory stipulates that liberal democracies do not engage in wars against each other and this has, so far, been empirically proven to be true (Tenenbaum, 2012). The emphasis here is on two key words: stable and liberal (Tenenbaum, 2012).

One can trace a clear connection between conflict resolution and development of strong democratic state institutions, such as effective legislation, vibrant civil society, transparent policies and accountable government, in particular, in the security sector. Galletti and Wodzicki note that rights holders are not simply reliant on the good will of the state to deliver rights, but should participate actively in developing and implementing policies that provide for those rights (as cited in Hofmann et al., 2016). Hänggi holds that it is not only the question of effective delivery of security, but also a concern for ensuring that such delivery respects democratic principles, the rule of law and human rights (as cited in Hofmann et al., 2016).

Post-Soviet states are often defined as incipient democracies, characterized by internal ideological tensions, clashes between old and new elites, nationalistic and conservative powers on political arena and emergent traditions of democratic institutions building. Most Western studies on political transformation tend to conclude that the optimal path of political change is described by the process of democratization, e.g. that is from an autocratic, totalitarian Soviet Republic toward a «consolidated democracy» (Haerpfer & 2018a, as cited in Mihr, 2020, p. 14). While analyzing post-Soviet space, local scholars believe that the period of post-Soviet transition in the region is already complete and as a result the «emergence of albeit authoritarian, but generally consolidated new types of political regimes that form sovereign statehood» took place (Malysheva, 2018, as cited in Mihr, 2020, p. 14). One can note that the utilized terms are «albeit authoritarian» and «generally consolidated», claiming that post-Soviet republics are democracies in transit rather than fully developed democracies for the time being.

Considering the criterion of international democracy rankings, there is a noticeable difference between Ukraine and Russia. According to Democracy Index 2021, Russia is on the 124th place out of 167 countries and its regime is characterized as «authoritarian», while Ukraine is on the 86th place out of 167 countries and is characterized by «hybrid» regime (Democracy Index 2021). Per this rating, Ukrainian positions are considerably better than Russian ones. Per Corruption Perceptions Index, Russia has 29/100 score (100 is very clean and zero is highly corrupt) and 136th rank among 180 countries (Corruption Perceptions Index 2021. Russia), while Ukraine has 32/100 score and 122nd rank (Corruption Perceptions Index 2021. Ukraine). Thus, per this criterion, overall, Ukraine's score is better than Russia's, yet both countries need to keep fighting corruption.

Besides, in order to assess the countries' level of democratization one needs to look at the aspect of elections. Tenenbaum notes that only states that hold free and fair elections on a regular basis, safeguard the rights of the minority and possess an independent judiciary fall within the

province of the definition of democracy (Tenenbaum, 2012). 2018 presidential elections in Russia can hardly be called fair and transparent. It was concluded that, overall, the process of handling election complaints lacked transparency (Russian Federation Presidential Election 18 March 2018. ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report). Out of a multitude of petitions, the Central Election Commission (CEC) deemed 420 to constitute complaints, but only considered two in public sessions and subsequently published those decisions (Russian Federation Presidential Election 18 March 2018. ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report). In view of perceived association of civic chambers with state authorities, their observation did not address the lack of legal standing for independent observation by citizenry (Russian Federation Presidential Election 18 March 2018. ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report). Besides, in 2020 the President of the Russian Federation Volodymyr Putin agreed to a proposal launched in the Russian Parliament that would reset the constitutional term-limit clock (Tefft, 2020). Theoretically speaking, this change would allow him to stay in power for two more terms of six years each after the current mandate finishes in 2024, extending his time as president until 2036 (Tefft, 2020).

Latest parliamentary elections held in the Russian Federation clearly do not fulfill the requirement of free and fair electoral process. The Russian government has spent the last few months oppressing opposition candidates (Russia's Parliamentary Elections, Explained. Atlantic Council). The Russian leadership convicted and jailed opposition leader Alexei Navalny, qualifying his network an «extremist» organization (Russia's Parliamentary Elections, Explained. Atlantic Council). The Russian government also keeps trying to discredit Navalny's «smart voting» initiative, which is a campaign aimed at increasing elections transparency (Russia's Parliamentary Elections, Explained. Atlantic Council). Thereby, it should be noted that Alexei Navalny became Sakharov Prize 2021 recipient (the most prestigious EU human rights award).

Latest presidential and parliamentary elections in Ukraine took place in 2019. Regarding the presidential elections, per Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions issued by the ODIHR Election Observation Mission on 1 April 2019, the election was competitive, voters had a broad choice and turned out in high numbers (Ukraine Presidential Election 31 March and 21 April 2019. ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report). The Election Observation Mission concluded that in the pre-electoral period the law was often not followed in good faith by many stakeholders, which negatively influenced the trust in the election administration, yet fundamental freedoms were overall respected (Ukraine Presidential Election 31 March and 21 April 2019. ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report).

Regarding latest parliamentary elections in Ukraine, per the Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions issued by ODIHR Election Observation Mission on 22 July 2019, «in the early parliamentary elections fundamental rights were generally respected, the campaign was competitive, despite numerous malpractices, in particular, in the majoritarian races» (Ukraine Early Parliamentary Elections 21 July 2019. ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report). Overall, the electoral administration was competent despite the short time available to prepare the elections, election day was generally peaceful, with observers of the Mission evaluating voting positively in the overwhelming majority of polling stations observed, however procedural shortcomings were noted in the tabulation (Ukraine Early Parliamentary Elections 21 July 2019. ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report). Thus, Ukraine's results in respect to holding elections look more optimistic than Russia's.

Besides, one can note two different trends – while Ukraine further aspires toward democracy supported by the international community, including the majority of the UN members, Russia demonstrates strengthening of authoritarianism. In particular, Gnyp (2019) holds that the scale of reforms that should be carried out in the Ukrainian government, political and economic systems, as well as in the society is truly gigantic – it implies no less than a radical transformation of political culture from postcolonial to democratic. After the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, civil society did not withdraw from politics, but became a powerful driving force for reforms; in addition, while the gains so far are still fragile and Ukraine is vulnerable, its movement has been set in the right direction (Gnyp, 2019). Whereas, per McFaul (2021), a comprehensive explanation for Russia's

transition from autocracy and back again counts on both structure and agency, but leans toward agency. In December 1991 the Soviet Union collapsed, its fifteen republics became independent countries, and Russia became a democracy for the first time since 1917 – or maybe for the first time ever (McFaul, 2021). Thirty years later, scholars argue over the degree of dictatorship that has taken hold, but no one classifies Russia as a democracy today (McFaul, 2021). In particular, in 2021, Freedom House gave Russia a global freedom score of 20 out of 100 and Reporters Without Borders' Press Freedom Index ranked Russia 150 of 180 countries (Freedom House, «Freedom in the World 2021: Russia»; Reporters Without Borders, as cited in McFaul, 2021). In the third and fourth waves of democratization, Russia's democratic collapse must rank as one of the most consequential setbacks (Geddes and Huntington, as cited in McFaul, 2021).

There is a clear connection between democracy and efficient civil society functioning. Democracy always goes along with affirmation of civil society organizations, which active citizens freely join for different purposes such as advocating for their interests and more productive dialogue with the authorities (Mihir, 2020). Respectively, lack of democracy is often connected with deficiencies of civil society development. There was little to no bottom-up approach in the former Soviet space, and instead a severe lack of a civil society movement that was ready to take a lead, in part or fully, in the democratization process (Mihir, 2020). Putnam (as cited in Shamaileh, 2017) treatise contends that civic associations have the ability to build trust between citizens, which, in turn, should enhance institutional performance within democracies. In accordance with the democratic peace agenda, it is necessary to develop civil society institutions and actively involve civil society groups in conflict resolution processes. Ukraine and Russia need to further progress in order to reach this goal, yet current respective trends in the two countries are diametrically opposite.

Democratic peace theory posits that interstate conflicts between two liberal democracies may emerge, but these are settled by peaceful rather than violent means. Moreover, this is not to say that liberal democracies may not engage in violent conflicts, but that these always involve a non-liberal democratic international actor (Tenenbaum, 2012). Apparently, in Ukraine-Russia relations namely Russia is characterized by use of illiberal policies and political pressure. Therefore, when tensions rose, a violent conflict was triggered as a means of resolving these tensions rather than resorting to strictly diplomatic instruments. Democratic peace theory is not a universal doctrine and can co-exist with a number of other approaches to peace building. Sroka et al. (2017) claim that one cannot but agree with the view held by the British theoretician of liberalism, John Gray (as cited in Sroka et al., 2017), claiming that states should be free to choose their course of development, as long as they do not represent a threat to others.

It can be **concluded** that democratic peace theory hardly appears to be a viable framework for Russia-Ukraine war analysis. Cases of this theory usage in various regions of the world demonstrate at least partial efficiency of the democratic peace theory and its main postulates, particularly, importance of the republican form of governance, economic cooperation and participation in international organizations as a means of safeguarding peace among nations. Usage of democratic peace theory in post-socialist and post-Soviet countries is often hindered by such factors as ideological differences, notions of prior elites, incipient traditions of democratic institutions' building, nationalism and conservatism. Thus, democratic peace theory can hardly be a productive framework for Russia-Ukraine war analysis, with regard to the three aforementioned tenets.

As to the first tenet of the democratic peace theory – republican institutions – both Ukraine and Russia are republics, and strictly formally fulfill this criterion, with Russia being a republic *de jure*. Regarding the second tenet of the democratic peace theory – economic interdependence (universal community) – the level of economic cooperation between Ukraine and Russia was traditionally significant in the 20th and 21st c. By the start of the war in 2014, one could witness a considerable, yet declining level of economic cooperation between Ukraine and Russia, complicated by asymmetrical relationship between the two states. According to the second tenet of the democratic peace theory, close economic cooperation should prevent countries from engaging in a violent conflict. Yet, presence of an asymmetric economic relationship between Russia and Ukraine, divergent visions of further political development, accompanied by aggressive Russian

foreign policy means increased the likelihood of the war. Even though, in accordance with the democratic peace theory tenet, considerable economic cooperation should have prevented Russian aggression against Ukraine as a trading partner, the initiated war can, apparently, be explained by political and security perceptions which outweighed purely economic factors. Regarding the third tenet of the democratic peace theory, one can witness a certain level of cooperation between Ukraine and Russia within international organizations, yet fundamental ideological differences between the two countries are vividly reflected in this sphere.

Thus, the initiated war can be explained by the statement that Ukraine is a transitional democracy, while Russia is a consolidated authoritarian regime. Ukraine is focused on furthering democratic reforms, such as effective implementation of the rule of law, fighting corruption and strengthening the impartial court system, while Russia keeps adhering to illiberal policies. Ukraine is currently spearheading a fight for democracy worldwide, while democracy development in the Russian Federation is further deteriorating.

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Теорія демократичного миру для аналізу російсько-української війни

Залишається актуальним питання, чи концепція демократичного миру є життєздатною для політичного порядку денного та системи міжнародних відносин XXI ст. Можна спостерігати як успішні, так і сумнівні приклади впровадження теорії демократичного миру, але очевидно, що перехід до демократії не завжди є безпроблемним і послідовним процесом. Метою статті є аналіз релевантності теорії демократичного миру для аналізу російсько-української війни. Обраний метод – історичний аналіз у межах теорії демократичного миру, себто розгляд політичного розвитку України та Росії, їхнього економічного співробітництва та участі в міжнародних організаціях. Крім того, для цілей дослідження було використано аналіз вторинних даних. Можна зробити висновок, що теорія демократичного миру навряд чи є життєздатною основою для аналізу російсько-української війни.

Щодо першого положення теорії демократичного миру – республіканських інститутів – Україна і Росія є республіками та суто формально відповідають цьому критерію, оскільки Росію можна вважати республікою тільки де юре. Стосовно другого положення демократичної теорії миру – економічної взаємозалежності (універсальної спільноти) – до початку війни 2014 року можна було спостерігати доволі значний рівень економічної співпраці між Україною та Росією, який тим не менше знижувався, а також був ускладненим асиметричними відносинами між двома країнами. Попри те, що, відповідно до теорії, значне економічне співробітництво мало запобігти російській агресії проти України як торговельного партнера, розпочату війну, вочевидь, можна пояснити політичними і безпековими міркуваннями, які переважили суто економічні чинники. Щодо третього положення теорії демократичного миру, можна засвідчити певний рівень співпраці між Україною та Росією в рамках міжнародних організацій, але принципові ідеологічні відмінності між двома країнами яскраво відображаються в цьому секторі. Можна зробити висновок, що теорія демократичного миру навряд чи є прийнятною для аналізу російсько-української війни, а причини війни, що триває, можна пояснити поточним статусом України як транзитивної демократії, що прагне до подальшого зміцнення демократичних цінностей, у той час, як Росія перетворилася на консолідований авторитарний режим. При цьому Україна нині очолює боротьбу за демократію в усьому світі, тоді як розвиток демократії в Росії дедалі погіршується.

Ключові слова: демократія, мир, теорія, Україна, громадянське суспільство, транзитивні держави, міжнародні організації.